

# Mathematical Logic

## Introduction on Modal Logics

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# TestBooks and Readings

- *Hughes, G. E., and M.J. Cresswell (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic. Routledge.*  
Introductory textbook. Provides an historic perspective and a lot of explanations.
- *Blackburn, Patrick, Maarten de Rijke, and Yde Venema (2001) Modal Logic. Cambridge Univ. Press*  
More modern approach. It focuses on the formalisation of frames and structures.
- *Chellas, B. F. (1980) Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge Univ. Press*  
The focus is on the axiomatization of the modal operators  $\Box$  and  $\Diamond$ .

# Origins of modal logics

- (Modern modal logic) Developed in the early twentieth century,
- **Clarence Irving Lewis**, thought that Russell's description of the truth-functional conditional operator as **material implication** (i.e,  $A \supset B$  is true if either  $A$  is false or  $B$  is true) was misleading.  
He suggested to define a new form of implication called **strict implication** which literally can be seen like this

it is not possible that  $A$  is true and  $B$  is false      (1)

- He proposed to formalise (1) as

$$\neg \diamond (A \wedge \neg B) \quad (2)$$

# Origins of modal logics - ctn'd

The novelties in  $\neg\Diamond(A \wedge \neg B)$  are:

- A **modal operator**  $\Diamond$  for representing the fact that a statement is *possibly true* (*impossible, necessary, ...*)
- The fact that the truth value of  $\neg\Diamond(A \wedge \neg B)$  is **not a function** of the truth values of  $A$  and  $B$  as it refers to a set of *possible situations* (lately called possible worlds) in which you have to consider the truth of  $A$  and  $B$ .

# What is Modality?

- A **modality** is an expression that is used to *qualify* the truth of a judgement (or, in other words, an operator that expresses a “mode” in which a proposition is true)
- It can be seen as an operator that takes a proposition and returns a more complex proposition.

## Example

Proposition	Modal Expression
John drives a Ferrari	John <i>is able to</i> drive a Ferrari
Everybody pays taxes	It is <i>obligatory</i> that everybody pays taxes

- Modalities are expressed in natural language through **modal verbs** such as *can/could*, *may/might*, *must*, *will/would*, and *shall/should*.

# What is Modality?

- In logic modalities are formalized using an operator such as  $\Box$  ( $\Diamond$ ) that can be applied to a formula  $\phi$  to obtain another formula  $\Box\phi$  ( $\Diamond\phi$ ).
- The truth value of  $\Box\phi$  is not a function of the truth value of  $\phi$ .

## Example

- The fact that John is able to drive a Ferrari may be true independently from the fact that John is actually driving a Ferrari.
- The fact that it is *obligatory* that everybody pays taxes is typically true, and this is independent from the fact that everybody actually pays taxes.

Note:  $\neg$  is not a modal operator since the truth value of  $\neg\phi$  is a function of the truth value of  $\phi$ .

# Modalities

- A **modality** is an expression that is used to *qualify* the truth of a judgement.
- Historically, the first modalities formalized with modal logic were the so called **alethic modalities** i.e.,
  - 1 it is **possible** that a certain proposition holds, usually denoted with  $\diamond\phi$
  - 2 it is **necessary** that a certain proposition holds, usually denoted with  $\square\phi$
- Afterwards a number of modal logics for different “*qualifications*” have been studied. The most common are. . .

# Modalities

Modality	Symbol	Expression Symbolised
Alethic	$\Box\phi$	it is <i>necessary</i> that $\phi$
	$\Diamond\phi$	it is <i>possible</i> that $\phi$
Deontic	$O\phi$	it is <i>obligatory</i> that $\phi$
	$P\phi$	it is <i>permitted</i> that $\phi$
	$F\phi$	it is <i>forbidden</i> that $\phi$
Temporal	$G\phi$	it will <i>always</i> be the case that $\phi$
	$F\phi$	it will <i>eventually</i> be the case that $\phi$
Epistemic	$B_a\phi$	agent <i>a</i> <i>believes</i> that $\phi$
	$K_a\phi$	agent <i>a</i> <i>knows</i> that $\phi$
Contextual	$ist(c, \phi)$	$\phi$ is <i>true in the context</i> $c$
Dynamic	$[\alpha]\phi$	$\phi$ must be true after the execution of program $\alpha$
	$\langle\alpha\rangle\phi$	$\phi$ can be true after the execution of program $\alpha$
Computational	$AX\phi$	$\phi$ is true for every immediate successor state
	$AG\phi$	$\phi$ is true for every successor state
	$AF\phi$	$\phi$ will eventually be true in all the possible evolutions
	$A\phi U\theta$	$\phi$ is true until $\theta$ becomes true
	$EX\phi$	$\phi$ is true in at least one immediate successor state



# Modal logics & relational structures

- Historically, modal logics were developed in order to formalise the different modalities that qualify the truth of a formula;
- Modern modal logics have a different goal. They are motivated by the study of relational structures.

## Definition (Relational structure)

A **relational structure** is a tuple

$$\langle W, R_{a_1}, \dots, R_{a_n} \rangle$$

where  $R_{a_i} \subseteq W \times \dots \times W$

- each  $w \in W$  is called, **point** (world, state, time instant, situation, ...)
- each  $R_{a_i}$  is called **accessibility relation** (or simply relation)

Alternative notation  $\langle W, R_a \rangle_{a \in A}$

# The importance of relational structures

- In Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Representation there are many examples of relational structures:
  - Graphs and labelled graphs;
  - Ontologies;
  - Finite state machines;
  - Computation paths; . . .
- Modal logics allow us to predicate on properties of relational structures.
  - Loop detection;
  - Reachability of a (set of) node(s);
  - Properties of a relation such as Transitivity, Reflexivity, . . . . .

# Examples of Relational structures

- Strict partial order (SPO)

$\langle W, < \rangle$   $<$  is transitive and irreflexive<sup>1</sup>

- Strict linear order

$\langle W, < \rangle$  (SPO) + for each  $v \neq w \in W$ ,  $v < w$  or  $w < v$

- Partial order (PO)

$\langle W, \leq \rangle$   $\leq$  is transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric

- Linear order

$\langle W, \leq \rangle$  (PO) + for each  $v, w \in W$ ,  $v \leq w$  or  $w \leq v$

- Labeled transition system (LTS)

$\langle W, R_a \rangle_{a \in A}$  and  $R_a \subseteq W \times W$


- XML document

$\langle W, R_l \rangle_{l \in L}$ ,  $W$  contains the components of an XML document  
and  $L$  is the set of labels that appear in the document

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<sup>1</sup>Antisymmetry follows.

# XML document as a relational structure



# Relational structures in FOL



- Relational structures can be investigated in FOL;
- The language must contain at least a binary relation  $R$ , and we can formalise the properties of a relational structure using formulae such as
  - $\forall xR(x, x)$  ( $R$  is reflexive)
  - $\forall x\exists yR(x, y)$  ( $R$  is serial)
  - $\forall xy(R(x, y) \supset R(y, x))$  ( $R$  is symmetric)
  - ...
- So, why do we need modal logics?

# Relational structures in first order and modal logic

- In First Order Logic we describes a relational structure from an external point of view, (and our description is not relative to a particular point).
- Modal logics describe relational structures from an **internal point of view**, rather than from the top perspective
- A formula has a meaning **in a point**  $w \in W$  of a structure


# Relational structures in first order and modal logic

In first order logic, relational structures are described **from the top point of view**. each point of  $W$  and the relation  $R$  can be named.



# Relational structures in first order and modal logic

In modal logics, relational structures are described from an **internal perspective** there is no way to mention points of  $W$  and the relation  $R$ .





# An example: seriality

Let us assume to have a strict linear serial order.

- In first order logic I can observe an infinite sequence of points;
- in modal logic I know that I can always move to the next point (that is, from the point where I am I can always see (and move to) a successor point).

# The Language of a basic modal logic

If  $\mathcal{P}$  is a set of primitive proposition, the set of formulas of the basic modal logic is defined as follows:

- each  $p \in \mathcal{P}$  is a formula (atomic formula);
- if  $A$  and  $B$  are formulas then  $\neg A$ ,  $A \wedge B$ ,  $A \vee B$ ,  $A \supset B$  and  $A \equiv B$  are formulas
- if  $A$  is a formula  $\Box A$  and  $\Diamond A$  are formulas.

# Intuitive interpretation of the basic modal logic

The formula  $\Box\phi$  can be intuitively interpreted in many ways

- $\phi$  is necessarily true (classical modal logic)
- $\phi$  is known/believed to be true (epistemic logic)
- $\phi$  is provable in a theory (provability logic)
- $\phi$  will be always true (temporal logic)
- ...

In all these cases  $\Diamond\phi$  is interpreted as  $\neg\Box\neg\phi$ .

In other words,  $\Diamond\phi$ , stands for  $\neg\phi$  is not necessarily true, that is,  $\phi$  is possibly true.

# Semantics for the basic modal logic

A **basic frame** (or simply a frame) is an algebraic structure

$$\mathcal{F} = \langle W, R \rangle$$

where  $R \subseteq W \times W$ .

An **interpretation**  $\mathcal{I}$  (or assignment) of a modal language in a frame  $\mathcal{F}$ , is a function

$$\mathcal{I} : P \rightarrow 2^W$$

Intuitively  $w \in \mathcal{I}(p)$  means that  $p$  is true in  $w$ , or that  $w$  is of type  $p$ .

A **model**  $\mathcal{M}$  is a pair  $\langle \text{frame}, \text{interpretation} \rangle$ . I.e.:

$$\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$$

# Satisfiability of modal formulas

Truth is relative to a world, so we define that relation of  $\models$  between a world in a model and a formula

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models p \text{ iff } w \in \mathcal{I}(p)$$

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \wedge \psi \text{ iff } \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \text{ and } \mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$$

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \vee \psi \text{ iff } \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \text{ or } \mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$$

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \supset \psi \text{ iff } \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \implies \text{implies } \mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$$

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \equiv \psi \text{ iff } \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \text{ iff } \mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$$

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \neg\phi \text{ iff not } \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi$$


$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \Box\phi \text{ iff for all } w' \text{ s.t. } wRw', \mathcal{M}, w' \models \phi$$

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \Diamond\phi \text{ iff there is a } w' \text{ s.t. } wRw' \text{ and } \mathcal{M}, w' \models \phi$$

$\phi$  is globally satisfied in a model  $\mathcal{M}$ , in symbols,  $\mathcal{M} \models \phi$  if

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \text{ for all } w \in W$$

# Satisfiability example



# Validity relation on frames

A formula  $\phi$  is **valid in a world  $w$  of a frame  $\mathcal{F}$** , in symbols  $\mathcal{F}, w \models \phi$  iff

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \phi \text{ for all } \mathcal{I} \text{ with } \mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$$

A formula  $\phi$  is **valid in a frame  $\mathcal{F}$** , in symbols  $\mathcal{F} \models \phi$  iff

$$\mathcal{F}, w \models \phi \text{ for all } w \in W$$

If  $\mathbf{C}$  is a class of frames, then a formula  $\phi$  is **valid in the class of frames  $\mathbf{C}$** , in symbols  $\models_{\mathbf{C}} \phi$  iff

$$\mathcal{F} \models \phi \text{ for all } \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{C}$$

A formula  $\phi$  is **valid**, in symbols  $\models \phi$  iff

$$\mathcal{F} \models \phi \text{ for all models frames } \mathcal{F}$$

# Logical consequence

- $\phi$  is a **local logical consequence of  $\Gamma$** , in symbols  $\Gamma \models \phi$ , if for every model  $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$  and every point  $w \in W$ ,

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \Gamma \text{ implies that } \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi$$

- $\phi$  is a **local logical consequence of  $\Gamma$  in a class of frames  $\mathcal{C}$** , in symbols  $\Gamma \models_{\mathcal{C}} \phi$  if for every model  $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I} \rangle$  with  $\mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{C}$  and every point  $w \in W$ ,

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \Gamma \text{ implies that } \mathcal{M}, w \models \phi$$



# Hilbert axioms for normal modal logic

<b>A1</b>	$\phi \supset (\psi \supset \phi)$
<b>A2</b>	$(\phi \supset (\psi \supset \theta)) \supset ((\phi \supset \psi) \supset (\phi \supset \theta))$
<b>A3</b>	$(\neg\psi \supset \neg\phi) \supset ((\neg\psi \supset \phi) \supset \phi)$
<b>MP</b>	$\frac{\phi \quad \phi \supset \psi}{\psi}$
<b>K</b>	$\Box(\phi \supset \psi) \supset (\Box\phi \supset \Box\psi)$
<b>Nec</b>	$\frac{\phi}{\Box\phi}$ the <b>necessitation rule</b>

The above set of axioms and rules is called **K**, and every modal logic with a validity relation closed under the rules of **K** is a **Normal Modal Logic**.

# Remark on Nec

Notice that **Nec** rule is not the same as

$$\phi \supset \Box\phi \tag{3}$$

indeed formula (3) is not valid.

**Assignment** Find a model in which (3) is false

## Exercise

Show that each of the following formulas is not valid by constructing a frame  $\mathcal{F} = (W, R)$  that contains a world that does not satisfy them.

1  $\Box \perp$

2  $\Diamond \phi \supset \Box \phi$

3  $\Diamond \Box \phi \supset \Box \Diamond \phi$

# Multi-Modal Logics

All the definitions given for basic modal logic can be generalized in the case in which we have  $n$   $\Box$ -operators  $\Box_1, \dots, \Box_n$  (and also  $\Diamond_1, \dots, \Diamond_n$ ), which are interpreted in the frame

$$\mathcal{F} = (W, R_1, \dots, R_n)$$

Every  $\Box_i$  and  $\Diamond_i$  is interpreted w.r.t. the relation  $R_i$ .

A logic with  $n$  modal operators is called **Multi-Modal**.

Multi-Modal logics are often used to model Multi-Agent systems where modality  $\Box_i$  is used to express the fact that “agent  $i$  knows (believes) that  $\phi$ ”.

## Exercise

Let  $\mathcal{F} = (W, R_1, \dots, R_n)$  be a frame for the modal language with  $n$  modal operator  $\Box_1, \dots, \Box_n$ . Show that the following properties holds:

- 1  $\mathcal{F} \models \mathbf{K}_i$  (where  $\mathbf{K}_i$  is obtained by replacing  $\Box$  with  $\Box_i$  in the axiom  $\mathbf{K}$ )
- 2 If  $R_i \subseteq R_j$  then  $\mathcal{F} \models \Diamond_i \phi \supset \Diamond_j \phi$
- 3 If  $R_i \subseteq R_j$  then  $\mathcal{F} \models \Box_j \phi \supset \Box_i \phi$
- 4  $\mathcal{F} \not\models \Box_i p \supset \Box_j p$  for any primitive proposition  $p$
- 5 If  $R_i \subseteq R_j \circ R_k$ , then<sup>a</sup>  $\mathcal{F} \models \Diamond_i \phi \supset \Diamond_j \Diamond_k \phi$

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<sup>a</sup>Given two binary relations  $R$  and  $S$  on the set  $W$ ,  
 $R \circ S = \{(v, u) \mid (v, w) \in R \text{ and } (w, u) \in S\}$

## Exercise

Prove that the following formulae are valid:

- $\models \Box(\phi \wedge \psi) \equiv \Box\phi \wedge \Box\psi$
- $\models \Diamond(\phi \vee \psi) \equiv \Diamond\phi \vee \Diamond\psi$
- $\models \neg\Diamond\phi \equiv \Box\neg\phi$
- $\neg\Box\Diamond\Box\Box\Diamond\Box\phi \equiv \Diamond\Box\Box\Diamond\Diamond\Box\Diamond\neg\phi$  (i.e., pushing in  $\neg$  changes  $\Box$  into  $\Diamond$  and  $\Diamond$  into  $\Box$ )

Suggestion: keep in mind the analogy  $\Box/\forall$  and  $\Diamond/\exists$ .

## Exercise

Consider the frame  $\mathcal{F} = (W, R)$  with

- $W = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$
- $R = \{(0, 1), (1, 2), \dots, (n-1, 0)\}$

Show that the following formulas are valid in  $\mathcal{F}$

- 1  $\Box\phi \equiv \Diamond\phi$
- 2  $\phi \equiv \underbrace{\Box \dots \Box}_n \phi$

Answer also the following questions:

- 3 can you explain which property of the frame  $R$  is formalized by formula 1 and 2?
- 4 Can you imagine another frame  $\mathcal{F}'$ , different from  $\mathcal{F}$  that satisfies formulas 1 and 2?

# Expressing properties on structures

formula true at $w$	property of $w$
$\diamond T$	$w$ has a successor point
$\diamond\diamond T$	$w$ has a successor point with a successor point
$\underbrace{\diamond \dots \diamond}_n T$	there is a path of length $n$ starting at $w$
$\square \perp$	$w$ does not have any successor point
$\square\square\perp$	every successor of $w$ does not have a successor point
$\underbrace{\square \dots \square}_n \perp$	every path starting from $w$ has length less than $n$



# Expressing properties on structures

formula true at $w$	property of $w$
$\diamond p$	$w$ has a successor point which is $p$
$\diamond\diamond p$	$w$ has a successor point with a successor point which is $p$
$\underbrace{\diamond \dots \diamond}_n p$	there is a path of length $n$ starting at $w$ and ending at a point which is $p$
$\square p$	every successor of $w$ are $p$
$\square\square p$	all the successors of the successors of $w$ are $p$
$\underbrace{\square \dots \square}_n p$	all the paths of length $n$ starting from $w$ ends in a point which is $p$